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LIABILITY OF ABSTRACTERS TO THIRD PARTIES
FOR OMISSIONS IN THE ABSTRACT
Where an abstracter has prepared a faulty abstract, it is generally
held that he is liable to the person who contracted for the abstract,'
to a third party who has been designated to the abstractor as the
ultimate user, 2 and to the undisclosed principal of the purchaser of the
abstract. 3 However, where a third party in privity with the purchaser
of the abstract but a stranger to the contract with the abstracter relies
on the faulty abstract, such third party, in the absepce of statutory
authority, is almost universally denied recovery against the abstracter.
This note deals with the remedies which such third party might have
against the abstracter.
I.

LIABILITY IN CONTRACT RATHER THAN IN TORT

The general rule is that an abstracter is liable in contract only,
rather than in tort, 4 and that his duty to prepare the abstract correctly
extends only to those in privity with him. 5 This doctrine first had its
expression many years ago when the United States Supreme Court held
that an attorney who erred in the preparation of an abstract was
liable only in contract to his client, and, in the absence of fraud or
collusion, was not liable to a third party not in privity who relied on
the faulty abstract. 6
This concept of liability only in contract flows from the fact that
an abstracter's duty is one created solely by his contract of employment,
and his failure to perform the duty created in this manner is solely a
breach of contract. As the Iowa Supreme Court has pointed out in a
leading case, not every breach of contract is a tort; only where the
making of the contract raises a legal duty that is coincident with the
contractual obligation (as in the case of a common carrier) does the
breach of contract constitute a tort. 7 The Florida Supreme Court in the
'Russell v. Polk County Abstract Co., 87 Iowa 233, 54 N. W. 212 (1893).
'Shine v. Nash Abstract & Investment Co., 217 Ala. 498, 117 So. 47 (1928).
'Young v. Lohr, 118 Iowa 624, 92 N. W. 684 (1902); Washington County Abstract
Co. v. Harris, 48 Okla. 577, 149 Pac. 1075 (1915).
'National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 (1879); Abstract & Title Guaranty
Co. v. Kigin, 21 Ala. App. 397, 108 So. 626 (1926).
'Thomas v. Guaranty Title & Trust Co., 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N. E. 183 (1910).
'National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 (1879).
"Russell v. Polk County Abstract Co., 87 Iowa 233, 54 N. W. 212 (1893). The
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case of Sickler v. IndianRiver Abstract Co.8 adhered to the general rule of
liability only in contract for the negligent preparation of an abstract,
and applied the principle that the liability extends only to those in
privity with the abstracter. While examination of some authoritie, shows
that although a duty is contractual it may place one of the parties in
such a position that he will have a duty of care to third parties, the
breach of which duty would appear to be tortious, 9 the courts have
not applied this principle to benefit an injured third party who relied
on an abstracter's faulty performance to his employer.
The logic and justice of denying recovery in tort have been questioned by some writers.1 0 One maintains that a duty to others to save
them from harm from the speaker's words should not be limited to
cases where physical peril will result from the misrepresentations, but
should also include cases where the loss is purely pecuniary."1 Another
writer suggests that, instead of straining the law of contracts to find
the third party to be a beneficiary of the contract between the abstracter
and his employer,' 2 it is more logical to employ the negligence formula,
leaving for the jury the application of the ordinary negligence test of
foreseeability. 13 Certainly where it is known that the abstract will be
used in making a sale, the vendee-third party is a member of a foreseeable class of persons who might rely on it. On principles of ordinary
negligence, it is sufficient that the injured party be a member of a
foreseeable class of persons who might suffer;' 4 however, in cases of
negligent misrepresentation liability exists only if the specific party injured is foreseeable. 15 To hold an abstracter liable in negligence to each
and every person who might in the future rely on a negligently prepared
abstract would render the business of examining titles so hazardous as
to be socially undesirable as well as legally unsound. L6
court stated that, where the duty is created solely by contract, the fact that the
breach is caused by negligence does not change the cause of action to one of tort;
it is merely the manner of accomplishing the breach. See PRossaa, HANDBOOx or THE
LAw OF ToaRs 201 (1941).

1142 FLa. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940).
PRossER, op. dt. supra note 7, at 206, 207.

9

'0Trusler, Extension of Liability of Abstracters, 18 MxCH. L. REv. 127 (1919).
"'Note, 21 HARv. L. REv. 439 (1908).
"See infra for a discussion of liability under the third-party beneficiary doctrine.
"Recent Cases, 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 876 (1934).
"Paisgraf
v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
1
3Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
lain the Ultramarescase, the New York Court, speaking through justice Cardozo,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol1/iss1/5

2

Hoehl: Liability of Abstracters to Third Parties for Omissions in the Ab
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
II.

LIABILITY ON THEORY OF VENDEE'S BEING
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY

The third party may gain relief on the theory that he is the beneficiary of the contract between the abstracter and the vendor. However,
in deciding what circumstances are necessary to establish the relying
third party as a beneficiary, the courts have stated that the mere custom

of vendors of procuring abstracts for presentation to the vendee is not
sufficient.' 7 The Arizona Supreme Court in a recent case18 held that
the abstracter who is to be bound on the third party beneficiary doctrine
must know not only that a third party will rely but must know the
identity of that third party, 19 and to this the Florida Supreme Court in
Sickler v. Indian River Abstract Co.20 has agreed. The court in the
Arizona case (cited by the Florida court in the Sickler case) gives no
authority for its holding that in all events the identity of a specific third
party beneficiary must be known to the abstracter. Since it is a general

principle of the law of contracts that a beneficiary need not be specifically determined at the time of making the contract, 2' this statement
of the Arizona court to the contrary appears questionable.
III.

RECOVERY IN DECEIT GROWING OUT OF CONSCIOUS IGNORANCE

One other means of relief to which the third party relying on the
faulty abstract might resort exists where the negligence of the abstracter
held that defendants, an accounting firm, were not liable on a negligence count to third
parties, not in privity with them, who relied on a faulty balance sheet. The opinion

includes an excellent summary of New York law on the extent to which liability for
negligent misrepresentation will be extended.
"Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d 1064;
Peterson v. Gales, 191 Wis. 137, 210 N. W. 407 (1926).
"Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continenal Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d 1065
(1934).

"The Arizona Court cited Anderson v. Spriesterbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166
(1912) and Dickel v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S. W. 896 (1890), in
which cases the identity of the specific third party was known to the abstracter.
20142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940).

"'Lawrence National Bank v. Rice, 82 F.2d 28 (C. C. A. 10th 1936); Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F.2d 75 (C. C. A. 5th 1935). In the Beckwith case,
the court held that a third party beneficiary can recover on a contract if he can be identified, even if he was not known or did not know of the contract at the time of its
execution. See 2 WsLLISTON, CONTRACTS 1906, §378 (Rev. ed. 1936) to the effect that
the beneficiary need not be determined at the time of making the contract. Accord,
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §139 (1932).
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has been so gross as to imply a fraud. In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche22
Justice Cardozo stated a doctrine of liability in deceit growing out of
conscious ignorance. In that case, the defendants were accountants who.
had prepared an incorrect balance sheet for an importing concern which,
incidentally, was keeping a false set of books. On the strength of the
balance sheet and the attached accountant's certificate that the balance
sheet represented the true financial condition of the company, the importers borrowed from the plaintiff large sums of money which were
never repaid. In a suit against the accountants the court dismissed the
plaintiff's count based on negligence, saying that the accountants were
not liable to a specific unforeseeable person who might rely on the balance
sheet. But the court found that the plaintiff did have a cause of action
in fraud. The false entries in the importer's accounts were so numerous
and obvious that the jury might firnd that, had the accountants made
the type of inspection that they held themselves out as having made,
the falsity would have been uncovered. Since it was not uncovered, the
reasonable inference was that, contrary to the statement on their certificate, the accountants did not have knowledge of the true financial
condition of the importing firm although they held themselves out as
having that knowledge. Thus there was a conscious ignorance, and,
although the accountants might believe their statement to be correct,
they had to their own knowledge no basis for such belief, and were not
23
exonerated thereby from liability for the falsity of the statement.
That the abstracter might place himself in the same position as the
accountants in the Ultramares case appears clear. If the abstracter
certifies that he has examined the mortgage records of the county and
has found no incumbrance, and he did, in fact, search but negligently
overlooked by honest blunder a recorded mortgage, the Ultramares
doctrine would afford no relief to the vendee third party not in privity
who relied on the abstract. But if the abstracter makes the same certificate where he has, to his knowledge, failed to search the mortgage
records, or made such a haphazard search that it could not be his
honest belief that no mortgage record existed, then he is guilty of holding
2 Tltramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); See Recent
Decisions, 19 CAL. L.-REv. 454 (1941), Comments, 16 CoRN. L. Q. 419 (1931), Recent Important Decisions, 29 M.cm. L. REv. (1931), Notes, 74 A. L. R. 1153 (1931).
"See Otis & Co. v. Grimes, 97 Colo. 219, 48 P.2d 788 (1935); Mulroy v. Wright,
185 Mlinn. 84, 240 N. W. 116 (1931); State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y.
104, 15 N. E.2d 416 (1938).
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himself out as having knowledge when knowledge he has none. In such
a state of facts the Ultramares doctrine would afford the third party
who relies upon the abstract, but is not in privity with the abstracter,
the opportunity to recover in fraud for such conscious ignorance.
The existence of a fraudulent intent or an intent to deceive is a
necessary element of the tort action of deceit. 2 4 The Florida Supreme
Court has held that scienter is sufficiently made out if the representation is in such positive terms as to imply that the party making it had
knowledge of its truth where, in fact, he had no knowledge of it and did
not know whether it was true or not; the required intent to deceive in
such cases is to be inferred from the facts in proof. 25
The difficulties that the third party might meet in proving the conscious ignorance of the abstracter are obvious. Whether the overlooking
of a single incumbrance in the records is evidence of a mere honest
blunder on the one hand (in which case the abstracter would not be
liable to a third party not in privity) or of a conscious ignorance and
recklessness on the other hand (in which case liability would exist to
such third party) and whether the court should permit the case to go
to the jury on this evidence alone are matters which the court must
decide under the particular circumstances of the case. If the court feels
that the overlooking of one entry in the records may appear so gross in
the eyes of reasonable men as to constitute conscious ignorance, the evidence should go to the jury.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the law stands today, the third party, unknown to the abstracter,
who relies to his loss on a faulty abstract is without remedy on either
principles of negligence or the third party beneficiary doctrine as applied
by the courts in cases involving abstracters. Although it is possible that
such third party may hold the abstracter liable in fraud for conscious
ignorance if such exists, the problems of proof may be overwhelming.
Because of these difficulties confronting the third party and the
injustice that frequently results, the legislatures of several states have
Williams v. McFadden, 23 Fla. 143, 1 So. 618 (1887); Knelling v. Roderick

Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N. Y. 78, 75 N. E. 1098 (1905).
2'Upchurch v. Mizell, 50 Fla. 456, 40 So. 29 (1905); Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla.
241, 25 So. 678 (1899) ; Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696, 15 So. 584 (1894).
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